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How journals manipulate the importance of research and one
way to fix it
Our methods of  rewarding research f oster an incentive f or journal editors to ‘game’ the
system, and one in f ive researchers report being pressured to include citations f rom the
prospective journal bef ore their work is published. Curt Rice  outlines how we can put an end
to coercive citations.
Over 20 per cent of  researchers have been pressured by journal editors to modif y their
articles in ways that manipulate the reputation of  the journal. Journals are ranked by the
citation rates of  the articles they publish. Editors can manipulate their journal’s ranking by
asking authors to include more citations of  other articles in that very journal.
An editor of  Leukemia wrote to an author whose work was about to be accepted. “You cite Leukemia once
in 42 ref erences. Consequently, we kindly ask you to add [more] ref erences of  articles published in
Leukemia to your present article.”
These data recently appeared in Science, where Allan W. Wilhite and Erica A. Fong dubbed the phenomenon
Coercive Citation in Academic Publishing.
While 80 per cent of  researchers say that coercive citation reduces the prestige of  a journal in their eyes,
60 per cent nonetheless admit that they would add citations f rom such a journal to their ref erence list
bef ore submitt ing their article to it.
This practice can be stopped by changing how we calculate a journal’s impact f actor. Impact f actors ref lect
average citation rates f or articles; a high impact f actor shows that a journal is important in its f ield.
When we determine impact f actors, we should simply exclude citations appearing in the journal at hand. If
the impact f actor of  Leukemia were computed without ref erence lists f rom articles in Leukemia itself ,
nothing could be gained f rom coercive citation.
Would this give a skewed picture of  the relative importance of  journals? It ’s true that curiousity-driven
research leads to specialization so narrow that only a f ew journals would be interested in any particular
article. As a result, new f indings in some sub-sub-sub-f ield — which is where researchers work — have very
f ew potential outlets. But this is true f or everyone and almost all journals, such that it shouldn’t lead to
unreasonably skewed citation indeces.
Another possible f ix is advocated by John G. Lynch, also in Science. Lynch organized several editors of
leading journals in his f ield to write a joint letter to 600 deans, identif ying the practice of  coercive citation
and its potential damage to the f ield. These editors encouraged deans to evaluate the quality of  their
f aculty members’ papers based on the articles themselves rather than the impact f actor of  the journals in
which they appear.
And, indeed, Lynch is right that evaluation and f unding cultures provide the context f or coercive citation.
When promotions are based on publication in journals with high impact f actors, the journal editors have a
motivation to get the best impact f actor they can because that will let them attract the best articles f rom
up-and-coming researchers. There’s an incentive to game the system.
When governments connect f unding f or universit ies to the number of  publications in dif f erent t iers of
journals — as the Norwegian government does — the lure of  corruption is introduced.
Universit ies carry out basic research that takes many years. Elected of f icials operate on shorter cycles;
polit icians want to give money to research and then see results during their relatively short period in of f ice.
The legit imate priorit ies of  universit ies and polit icians are theref ore at t imes in conf lict.
Attempts to resolve the conf lict — primarily about how long it takes to get results — give rise to systems
based on metrics, on counting. And systems based on counting can be gamed.
The game we learned about f rom Wilhite and Fong — the game of  coercive citation — can be f ixed. Doing
so will strengthen our conf idence in the system.
That way, when we have good results, we can try to publish them in the best possible journal, conf ident
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that the quality of  the journal ref lects the quality of  the research others have published there, and not just
the vastness of  their ref erence lists.
For more writ ing on gaming scholarly publication, check out the DrugMonkey blog at scientopia, a post at
the scholarly kitchen, and S. Scott Graham’s blog entry on citation coercion.
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